The Chinese Maritime Policy Law Part 2

hello everyone welcome back to my channel don't forget to like comment and subscribe this channel okay today I will continue my explanation about the Chinese Maritime poly slow um the previous article I have explained about uh in on the March for 2021 by Tink wheeling and on February 11 2021 by Takashi Saito and then now I will explain on February 16th 2021 so Cooley a professor at the in high University law in Incheon South Korea provide this statement with China's passage of the new Maritime police law conflict of her suffering right and exercise of jurisdiction by the irrelevant Coastal State called Escalade well the law seems to predominantly darker the United States Japan and the coastal state of the South China Sea the Yellow Sea attention to the Korean Peninsula and the water surrounding Leo too and the northern East China Sea will not be free from low enforcement by China in the event the laws in Richmond raises tension in Regional Waters Maritime activated surround the provisional Minister Zone in the Yellow Sea will likely become a sensitive issue involving a degree of law enforcement Federal fund States if the manifestation of China's law enforcement becomes conspicuous the primary means of response from South Korea would likely be non-military however was in military Asian is also possible in particular if the chairman of uh if the jimin for a law enforcement related to China's increased Maritime Powers emerges South Korea's neighboring seals May certainly turn into Seas of conflict the conflict should be over American scientific research military surface exploration of resources slow uh law enforcement or installation of facilities this is one of each type of conflict under international law can be divided into the activities a lot in overlapping jurisdiction and the required responses as part of exercising unilateral so foreign right China's American police law clearly will expand conflict involving sensitive issues regarding the operation of mirror timeline enforcement and activities in Northeast Asia nonetheless the inner enrichment of the law by itself is not a violation of international law instead it should be recorded as the application of a software so foreign right that requires a that requires other countries to exercise restraint due to the professional measure this means that law enforcement by the China Coast Guard should carefully consider International judicial decisions State practices and the geopolitical climate of the International 

Community in the meantime the Korean go Squad must continue following China State practices regarding maritime law enforcement meanwhile violations of United Nations convention on the law of the sea article 74 Section 3 and 83 Section 3 as well as other relevant International Norms should be raised when using law enforcement in underfined waters therefore it is important to follow the implementation of norms on maritime law enforcement in the International Community to interpret future laws by China well South Korea's gosport Act is in full oppression more needs to be done to establish standard for the use of weapons by the gospel this will be utilized as a basis for concrete law enforcement by field agents as well as a break condition for providing education on appropriate responses in an environment where States struggle forehead for hegemony and wear conflict of our Maritime activities in Regional Waters is increasing it is evident that China's management of the maritime police law hell will high Teng International School scrutiny sululi is a professor at the entire 

University Law School in intern South Korea and then the next on February uh 16 2021 challenge an associate professional with the Department of political science of the National University of Singapore provides this statement responses to the prc's your Maritime police law are largely modded including from Singapore which was previously and understood understandably focal proponent of rule of law internationally given its small size and relatively limited capabilities it is possible the assertive PRC Behavior over Maritime disputes economic interests and pay Kings offer of covid-19 vaccines have discouraged more physical reaction a lesson Singapore may have learned from its Fiction with Beijing over the rule of law between 2012 and 2017. culminating in the Detention of Singaporean armored vehicles in a Chinese sport Inlet 2016 is the Asylum space this quiz cents could also have to do with timing those interact introduction message and operationalization to offer to dealt with the top in 

Myanmar which captured headlines in South Asia and around the world governments in the region and Beyond are already struggling to copy the covenanting pandemic and they have press used a spare capacity to focus on what looks on paper like the domestic local change even the United States seemed to encross it with its substantial domestic health and political hope and political rules to pay sustained attention this absence of a reaction called have prompted Singapore to hold its peace nonetheless the new low May well end up further complete complicated staying original differences out of our Maritime claims in dispute areas [Music] I'm sorry effort to enforce what is effectively domestic law in disputed water essentially implied that those areas are under prison jurisdiction something that other climates and interested parties will find difficult to accept we are still law enforcement in disputed Waters could push other climate sub against domestic nationalist sentiment forcing them to escalate a dispute and invite an even more heavy-handed PRC response [Music] the maritime police law also utters the Baseline for ongoing discussion about a court of conduct between Beijing and the association of service as your nation or asean since the court of conduct is supposed to establish mutually acceptable behaviors for actors in disputed areas of the South China Sea other parties need to accept PRC exceptionalism demand similar treatment or ask the PRC to risk reskin the law if none of these options are mutually acceptable then Beijing Beer's responsibility for an impasse or even the failure of negotiation even if other actors including Singapore turn openly State their misgivings the misgivings the silence resentment May strain the prc's future ties with asean and other actors challenge is an association associate profession with the Department of political science of the National University of 

Singapore and then the next February 16 2021 muyen Hong Tao an associate professor in the low diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and National University of Hanoi provide this statement from February 1st 2021 onward the China goes for the largest goal scored in the world as the right to fire on foreign vessels in freeing on Waters under China's jurisdiction Beijing emphasized that the first part of normal legislative activity at the national people's comrades however the new law has caused anxiety and concern in the International Community it sets a president for China to use national law to settle internet's Channel dispute in contested Waters in the east and south Genesis as different under the United Nations convention on the law of the sea in this way it is also Violet article 27 at the Vienna convention on the law of treaties in 1969 which provided a party may not invoke the provision of its intern now low as justification for its failure to perform a treaty again that's all for today dance writing record like comment subscribe the channel see you next article and bye

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